Tax Evasion Confusion in the Ninth Circuit by Stanley, Kimberly
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Publications Faculty Scholarship
2007
Tax Evasion Confusion in the Ninth Circuit
Kimberly Stanley
Golden Gate University School of Law, kstanley@ggu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs
Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Publications by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stanley, Kimberly, "Tax Evasion Confusion in the Ninth Circuit" (2007). Publications. Paper 119.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/119
 1
Tax Evasion Confusion in the Ninth Circuit 
by Prof. Kim Stanley, Golden Gate University School of Law 
 
 
It is well settled that the crime of tax evasion under IRC §7201 has three 
fundamental elements.  The statute requires the government to prove (1) the existence of 
a tax deficiency, (2) willfulness in the attempted evasion of taxes, and (3) an affirmative 
act constituting an evasion or attempted evasion.1  However, two recent Ninth Circuit tax 
evasion cases have muddied the waters – resulting in opposite outcomes – and have tax 
practitioners questioning the court’s reasoning.     
 
In the first case, United States v. Boulware, 2 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
defendant’s tax evasion conviction even though the district court refused to instruct the 
jury that the funds he diverted from his small corporation might not constitute a taxable 
dividend under IRC § 301 if the corporation lacked earnings and profits.  If the diverted 
funds were not taxable to Boulware as a dividend, his failure to report the income was not 
fraudulent and would not create a tax deficiency, essential elements supporting the 
government’s tax evasion charge.  This case is on its way to the US Supreme Court, 
which granted the defendant’s petition for certiorari in September 2007.     
 
In the second case, United States v. Kayser,3 the defendant again complained of a 
faulty jury instruction, but this time the Ninth Circuit agreed and reversed his tax evasion 
conviction.  The court ruled in Kayser that the district court should have instructed the 
jury that business deductions the defendant claimed on his corporation’s tax return 
instead might have been used to eliminate his unreported individual taxable income.  
Consequently, the court ruled that the government fell short of establishing that the 
defendant had a tax deficiency and did not meet its burden of proving each of the 
elements of tax evasion under IRC § 7201.  The common question in both cases:  may a 
person defend against a tax evasion charge by arguing that he might have owed no tax at 
all had he reported the transaction differently?  By answering “no” in Boulware and “yes” 
in Kayser, the Ninth Circuit’s confused and irreconcilable analysis does not withstand 
scrutiny.   
 
United States v. Boulware  
 
Michael Boulware was the founder, president, and sole owner of a closely held 
corporation, Hawaiian Isles Enterprises (“HIE”).4   By 1985, HIE had a number of 
business ventures that included tobacco distribution, coffee processing and sales, arcade 
games and vending machines, and was reporting gross receipts of over $55 million. 5   
Boulware was indicted for tax evasion, among other crimes, on the Government’s claim 
that he had diverted to himself more than $10 million from HIE and failed to report or 
pay tax on this income for years 1989 through 1997. 6  Boulware was convicted on the 
four counts of tax evasion and appealed.7  On the first appeal of his conviction, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed because the district court erroneously excluded evidence that a Hawaii 
state court had adjudicated Boulware’s rights in certain funds diverted from HIE.   
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On retrial, Boulware raised a new argument – the so-called “return of capital” 
defense.  Boulware wanted to put on expert testimony to explain to the jury that the 
money he diverted from HIE might not constitute his personal taxable income if the funds 
were a return of his capital investment in the corporation.  Under IRC § 301, if a 
corporation has no current or accumulated earnings and profits for the taxable year in 
which a distribution is made to a shareholder, the distribution is not treated as a taxable 
dividend.  Rather, the distribution is characterized as a nontaxable return of the 
shareholder’s basis in his stock of the corporation, and any distribution in excess of the 
shareholder’s stock basis is treated as capital gain from the sale or exchange of the stock.8  
Similarly, IRC § 316 defines a dividend as any distribution by a corporation to a 
shareholder “out of its earnings and profits.”  Boulware argued that the jury should be 
instructed that if HIE did not have earnings and profits during the year he diverted the 
funds, the funds would have been a nontaxable return of his capital investment.  In such 
circumstances, he argued that his failure to report the diverted corporate funds as taxable 
income was not fraudulent because the diversion would not have created a tax deficiency, 
thus eliminating an essential element of the crime for which he was charged.     
 
The district court, however, refused to allow Boulware to introduce evidence 
concerning the return of capital defense.  Citing United States v. Miller,9 the district court 
ruled that Boulware had to show not only that the funds he diverted from HIE could have 
been a nontaxable return of capital, but also that they were, in fact, intended to be a return 
of capital at the time of the transfer.  Since Boulware did not proffer evidence tending to 
establish that the corporation’s records reflected the distribution of funds as a return of 
capital, the court rejected his instruction.  He was again convicted on all counts.10  On 
appeal of his second conviction to the Ninth Circuit, Boulware argued that the district 
court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the return of capital defense.  The Ninth 
Circuit concluded there was no reversible error and affirmed his conviction.11   
 
a. The return of capital defense 
 
 The Ninth Circuit did not write on a blank slate in Boulware.  The return of 
capital defense has long been recognized in civil tax cases; courts agree that under IRC 
§301 a distribution of corporate funds are taxable income to the shareholder only to the 
extent the corporation had earnings and profits during the year in which the distribution 
occurred.12  Although the federal courts of appeal disagree about the use of the return of 
capital defense in criminal tax evasion cases, the Ninth Circuit had addressed the issue in 
its 1976 opinion United States v. Miller. 13  The defendant in Miller was convicted of tax 
evasion for diverting $197,000 from a small corporation he controlled.  On appeal, Miller 
argued that the diverted funds, although not reported as his income, did not cause a tax 
deficiency because the corporation lacked earnings and profits during the year he diverted 
the funds.14  Characterizing this defense as “an extremely technical argument,”15 the 
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the corporation “was not shown to have had any 
earnings and profits during the period under consideration.” 16  However, the court 
explained that even if Miller’s return of capital defense were accepted, by his own 
admission he still would have had a tax deficiency of $1,699 long term capital gain, 
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which was, in the court’s view, “substantial enough” to support a tax evasion conviction 
under IRC § 7201. 17    
 
Nevertheless, the Miller court went on to discuss whether the corporate funds 
Miller diverted were taxable as income or were a return of his capital investment in the 
corporation.18  Starting from the shaky premise that it is normally “relatively 
unimportant” in a tax evasion case to characterize the nature of diverted funds “since the 
primary question is not the amount of the evasion but whether the taxpayer intended to 
evade and defeat his taxes,”19 the Ninth Circuit confirmed that this characterization was 
“more critical” in Miller because “there are no corporate earnings and profits from which 
a dividend could be paid.”20  The court conceded that “[i]f the corporation has no 
earnings and profits and if the taxpayer’s cost basis of the stock exceeds the amount of 
the diverted funds, the application of the constructive distribution rules . . . would permit 
the taxpayer to escape conviction . . . .” 21  The court was obviously troubled by the 
anomaly that Miller could be found guilty of willfully attempting to evade taxes (by 
engaging in fraudulent activities and hiding the diverted funds on corporate records as 
nontaxable loan repayments) but that, due to an “after-the-fact categorization” of the 
diverted funds as a return of capital, he could escape a tax evasion conviction because the 
diverted funds were taxable as a dividend due to the lack of corporate earnings and 
profits.22     
 
Ultimately, the Miller court held that the constructive distribution rules of IRC 
§301 could be applied in tax evasion cases, but not “automatically.”23  The court felt the 
primary focus in a tax evasion case should be whether the defendant willfully intended to 
evade taxes by diverting corporate funds, rather than the nature or characterization of the 
diverted funds –  
 
Where the taxpayer has sought to conceal income by filing a false return, 
he has violated the tax evasion statutes.  It does not matter that that 
amount could have somehow been made nontaxable if the taxpayer had 
proceeded on a different course.  [fn. omitted]  To apply the constructive 
distribution rules to this situation would nullify all of the taxpayer’s prior 
unlawful acts. 24    
 
The Ninth Circuit in Miller left open the door for a tax evasion defendant to raise a return 
of capital defense where there is “some demonstration on the part of the taxpayer and/or 
the corporation that such distributions were intended to be such a return.”25  (Emphasis 
added.)  In a footnote, the court further explained that once a taxpayer assumes control of 
diverted corporate funds he commits the crime of tax evasion if he fails to report the 
funds as income or fails to “make any adjustments in the corporate books to reflect a 
return of capital . . . .”26    Because defendant Miller “presented no concrete proof that the 
amounts were considered, intended, or recorded on the corporate records as a return of 
capital at the time they were made,” the court held that it had no factual basis on which to 
conclude that they were nontaxable corporate distributions. 27    
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The Miller decision represents a “middle of the road” position.  A majority of 
circuits (Eleventh, Sixth, and Third) now require the government in a criminal tax evasion 
case to prove only that the taxpayer had “actual command” over the diverted corporate 
funds; whether corporate earnings and profits existed in the year the defendant diverted 
the funds is wholly irrelevant.28  In contrast, the Second Circuit allows defendants in both 
civil and criminal cases involving diverted corporate funds to raise the return of capital 
defense.29  In rejecting the reasoning of the other circuits, the court explained that if all 
the government must do to prove criminal tax evasion is to show that a taxpayer had 
“actual command” over diverted corporate funds and took affirmative acts to evade 
paying taxes, the government no longer has to prove the existence of a tax deficiency, 
thereby eliminating that element of the crime under § 7201.30  In such situations, the 
government would bear a higher burden of proof in a civil tax matter – in which diverted 
funds are taxable only on a showing that there were corporate earnings and profits -- than 
in a criminal tax evasion prosecution, clearly a nonsensical result.31  The Second Circuit’s 
conclusion is straightforward -- “[t]he diversion of the funds cannot constitute a criminal 
offense, despite criminal intent, if no taxes are due.”32  For these reasons, the Second 
Circuit allows a criminal defendant to raise lack of corporate earnings and profits as a 
defense in criminal tax evasion cases, provided the diversion of funds itself was lawful.33  
The court expressly disagreed with Miller that a tax evasion defendant must establish that 
diverted funds were intended to be treated as a return of capital34 --   
 
[I]n return of capital cases, a taxpayer’s intent is not determinative in 
defining the taxpayer’s conduct.  That is, the taxpayer or the corporation 
need not have described the distribution at issue as a dividend or a return 
of capital at the time it was made; rather, the realities of the transaction – 
including the amount of the shareholder’s basis and the corporation’s 
earnings and profits, as well as the amount of the distribution – govern its 
characterization for tax purposes.35 
 
 b. Boulware’s limitation on the return of capital defense 
 
 In Boulware, the defendant wanted to put on expert testimony to explain that the 
funds he diverted might not constitute taxable income if they were a loan repayment, or 
used by him for corporate purposes, or if HIE had insufficient earnings and profits to 
characterize the funds as constructive dividend distributions under IRC § 301.  The 
district court ruled, however, that his offer of proof failed Miller’s threshold – he must 
show not merely that the funds could have been a nontaxable return of capital, but that 
they were, in fact, intended to be a return of capital at the time of the transfer.36  On 
appeal, Boulware renewed the argument that applying Miller’s intent requirement 
“creates a disconnect” between civil and criminal tax liability by allowing a criminal 
conviction in the absence of proof that the unreported diversion of corporate funds caused 
a tax deficiency.37  The Ninth Circuit affirmed, however, holding that it was bound by 
Miller, and that the district court properly had required Boulware to first lay a factual 
foundation that the diverted amounts “were considered, intended, or recorded on the 
corporate records as a return of capital at the time they were made.” 38  The court 
reiterated the Miller rationale that --  
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[w]here the taxpayer has sought to conceal income by filing a false return, 
he has violated the tax evasion statutes.  It does not matter that the amount 
could have somehow been made non-taxable if the taxpayer had 
proceeded on a different course. 39 
 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Thomas stated that the court’s decision, while consistent 
with Miller, allows a defendant to be “criminally sanctioned for tax evasion without 
owing a penny in taxes to the government,” which was, in his view, “in flat contradiction 
with the tax evasion statute’s requirement of ‘the existence of a tax deficiency.’”40    
 
United States v. Kayser   
 
Following a few months after its opinion in Boulware, the Ninth Circuit was again 
faced with whether Miller precluded a criminal tax evasion defendant from instructing 
the jury that he might not have had a tax deficiency if he had alternatively characterized 
his income or expenses.  In United States v. Kayser, 41 the Ninth Circuit agreed that 
Miller did not preclude a defendant from reporting his income and deductions in one way 
and then arguing for an alternative characterization at trial, and reversed the conviction.   
 
In Kayser, the taxpayer worked as an independent contractor for an internet 
shopping site, and incorporated a small corporation to receive the income he earned and 
claim business deductions.  The government alleged that Kayser had received $104,000 
of income in 1999 that should have been reported on his individual return; Kayser, 
however, reported that income on his corporate return.  For 2000, the government 
established that Kayser failed to report his earnings on either his individual or corporate 
returns, but he did report some $49,026 of business deductions on his 2000 corporate 
return. 42  These business deductions created a net operating loss for the corporation in 
2000 which he carried back and used to eliminate the corporation’s taxable income he 
had reported for 1999.43      
 
 Kayser was indicted on two counts of attempted income tax evasion for 1999 and 
2000 under IRC § 7201.  At trial, Kayser argued that he had not willfully evaded paying 
taxes, and that the income he failed to report on his individual return for 2000 should 
have been offset by the $49,026 in business deductions he claimed, erroneously he now 
argued, on his 2000 corporate tax return.  Kayser’s accountant testified that the expenses 
were typical business expenses actually incurred in 2000 and were substantiated by 
Kayser’s books and records.  Kayser requested a jury instruction that if he had 
“unclaimed deductions which would have offset his tax liability such that there was no 
tax due and owing, then there is no tax deficiency.” 44  The district court declined to give 
this instruction, holding that Kayser had not introduced evidence that he had any 
previously “unclaimed deductions,” and that, under Miller, he could not use the 
deductions he already had reported on his corporate return to negate his individual tax 
deficiency.45  The jury found Kayser guilty of tax evasion for 2000 but failed to reach a 
verdict on the tax evasion charge for 1999.46  
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed Kayser’s conviction on the ground the jury 
should have been instructed that the $49,026 in business deductions he had reported on 
his corporate return might have been used to offset his unreported individual income in 
2000.47  Beginning with the well recognized rule that a defendant in a tax evasion case 
may negate the existence of a tax deficiency with evidence of unreported deductions,48 
the court held that Kayser was entitled to demonstrate at trial that his deductions could 
have offset his unreported individual taxable income, even though that position was 
inconsistent with his own tax reporting which had used the same deductions to offset his 
corporation’s taxable income.49  Neither Miller nor Boulware precluded this result, in the 
court’s view.  To the contrary, the court offered that Miller’s return of capital defense 
failed only because the factual evidence supported the district court’s finding that the 
diverted funds were additional taxable salary rather than a loan repayment (as reported on 
the corporate books) or other nontaxable return of capital.50  The court concluded that 
“[t]he import of our holding in Miller is that a defendant remains free to present evidence 
that funds diverted from a corporation are a non-taxable return of capital, regardless of 
the manner in which he or the corporation originally reported the transaction.” 51    
 
The court also distinguished Boulware, stating in a footnote that it “did not 
conclude that Boulware was bound by the manner in which he originally reported the 
transaction,” or that Boulware could not introduce evidence to support his return of 
capital defense. 52  “Rather,” the court continued, “we held that under Miller, Boulware 
was required to show that the distribution was intended to be a return of capital,” and that 
the evidence he proffered did not establish that the diverted funds “were considered, 
intended, or recorded on the corporate records as a return of capital at the time they were 
made . . . .”53  The court summed up its holding in Kayser as follows –  
 
[W]e hold that if Kayser had business expenses that were allowable offsets 
against his individual income, he had the right to show them and explain 
them as part of his defense for tax evasion. . . . The fact that Kayser 
improperly reported the deductions he now claims negate his individual 
deficiency . . .  does not alter our conclusion.  Kayser’s improper report of 
deductions on his corporate return does not change the underlying nature 
of these expenses . . . .” 54 
 
In a biting dissent, Judge Kozinski stated that the majority’s holding in Kayser 
“jumped the rails” and was not only without support but in conflict with the Court’s 
rulings in Miller and Boulware.55  In his view, the majority erred because Kayser did not 
have “unused” deductions to offset his unreported income for 2000 – he had already used 
the $49,026 in business deductions to entirely eliminate his corporation’s 1999 taxable 
income.  Thus, the case was unlike those where the defendants had failed to report 
allowable business deductions and so were not bound by any prior use or characterization 
of the deficiency-eliminating deductions. 56  
 
Moreover, the majority was, in the dissent’s view, completely at odds with Miller 
and Boulware because neither defendant was allowed to argue for a nontaxable 
characterization of the funds unless the distributions were reflected as such in the 
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corporation’s records.  Thus, even though the defendants could later claim, as a matter of 
“economic reality,” that the distribution was a return of capital, the court ruled it “was of 
no consequence, because contemporaneously maintained records did not support that re-
characterization.”57  The dissent reiterated that the Court’s ruling opened the door for a 
defendant to be criminally convicted for tax evasion regardless whether he owed any 
taxes.  Unlike Boulware, the dissent emphasized that Kayser did not hold the defendant to 
the manner in which he “papered” the transaction58  --   
 
The same deductions cannot be used twice: He can either use them to wipe 
out his 2000 personal income or he can carry them back to wipe out his 
1999 corporate income.  Having chosen to do the latter when he filed his 
returns, the deductions are used up and are not available to offset his 2000 
personal income.  Contrary to the majority’s holding . . .  Kayser does not 
have allowable deductions that were not reported on his return.  Even if 
the deductions in question could have been treated as personal deductions, 
had Kayser claimed them as such on his individual return, the district 
court properly concluded that Kayser is stuck with the way he reported 
them at the time – which was as corporate deductions.  To let him now go 
back and treat the deductions as applicable to his personal income allows 
for precisely the kind of heads-I-win, tails-the-government-loses scenario 
that Miller sought to foreclose.   
 
Is form controlling substance?  
 
One strains to reconcile the Ninth Circuit’s recent tax evasion rulings because the 
court first exalts form over substance in Boulware, and then completely ignores it in 
Kayser.  Certainly the court understands that for a person to be liable for the crime of tax 
evasion under IRC § 7201, the government must prove not only that the defendant 
engaged in fraudulent behavior with an intention to evade his taxes, but that he actually 
had a tax liability to evade.  If it turns out, after the fact, that notwithstanding his 
fraudulent behavior the defendant for some legitimate reason has no civil tax liability, 
there is no basis for a tax evasion conviction.  The court got it wrong in both Boulware 
and Kayser.        
 
Boulware acknowledges that its holding allows a conviction for tax evasion 
without proof there was a civil tax liability, but deflects by stating that result is mandated 
by Miller.59  In Miller, the court indeed opined that “it [didn’t] matter” that a tax evasion 
defendant’s civil tax liability “could have somehow been made non-taxable if the 
taxpayer had proceeded on a different course,”60 but was dealing with a defendant that 
conceded he would have a tax deficiency even with the return of capital defense.  While 
one certainly cannot condone acts that are intended to defraud the government, the fact 
remains that the crime of tax evasion requires that those fraudulent activities result in the 
evasion of a tax that is actually owed.  If the taxpayer can establish that despite fraudulent 
acts he does not owe any taxes, such as through unused deductions or credits, he has not 
committed the crime of tax evasion, as the courts have always acknowledged and the 
statute mandates.      
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Boulware holds that a tax evasion defendant may raise the return of capital 
defense only if there is contemporaneous evidence that the corporation intended the 
diversion of funds to be characterized as a return of the shareholder’s capital investment.  
No after-the-fact or technical arguments that the funds are somehow nontaxable will 
suffice.  Yet this adherence to the form of the transaction is unusual in taxation – perhaps 
even unheard of.  Particularly where, as here, it is the lack of form – i.e., any corporate 
indication that the funds were intended to be a return of capital – that has bound the 
taxpayer.  If in substance the funds would not have constituted taxable income, and the 
taxpayer can prove that, it should not matter how the corporation papered the transaction.   
 
Indeed, there is no requirement that a corporation have or record any “intention” 
regarding a distribution of funds to a shareholder.   (And if that were the test, it certainly 
would be an easy thing for sole shareholders such as Boulware or Kayser to make such a 
recording on their corporate books.)  Rather, the characterization of the funds in the 
hands of the shareholder as taxable or nontaxable is mandated by statute and turns on the 
objective existence of corporate earnings and profits, not on some subjective corporate 
“intention.”  The court’s refusal to allow Boulware to put on evidence that HIE lacked 
earnings and profits precluded him from refuting an essential element of the charge 
against him.  The court’s distinction that the characterization of the funds for civil tax 
purposes under § 301 is irrelevant in a criminal tax case is nonsensical because it is the 
existence of a civil tax deficiency that is an essence of the crime.   
 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Kayser acknowledged that substance governs 
form and that an asserted tax liability (as part of a criminal tax evasion case) can be 
eliminated through after-the-fact tax maneuverings by using otherwise unreported tax 
deductions.  But in Kayser the form was the substance – the deductions had already been 
used in to offset the corporation’s taxable income.  While the court acknowledged that 
the deductions could not be used twice, the ruling would allow the defendant to shift the 
already-used deductions from his corporate return to his personal return.  That shift 
would have the effect of eliminating his individual tax liability, leaving his fraudulent act 
of omitting that income, standing alone, insufficient to support a tax evasion conviction.  
Although the deduction shift would have simultaneously created a tax deficiency on the 
corporate side, this deficiency arguably would not be sufficient to support a tax evasion 
conviction because he had not fraudulently omitted reporting the corporation’s income 
that year.  In one fell swoop, the court allows the defendant to cover all his sins.   
 
If the court is correct in Kayser that a taxpayer may completely rewrite his tax 
return to immunize himself against criminal liability, consistency requires the same in 
Boulware.  If a taxpayer has diverted corporate funds, but there is evidence that the 
corporation had earnings and profits during the year the funds were diverted, the 
diversion has not resulted in a tax deficiency and there is no crime.  That the corporation 
failed to characterize the distribution in a particular manner at the time should not 
overcome the clear statutory authority that treats the distribution as a nontaxable return of 
capital.     
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